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Forecasting and Backcasting: Predicting the
Impact of Events on the Future
JANE E. J. EBERT
DANIEL T. GILBERT
TIMOTHY D. WILSON*
In many choices they make—for example, choosing between a movie and a play
or deciding whether to attend a sports game shortly before a birthday party—
consumers are guided by how they expect an event will make them feel. They
may predict their feelings by forecasting (imagining their feelings when the im-
pacting event occurs, then considering how those feelings might changeovertime)
or by backcasting (imagining their feelings in a future period, then considering how
those feelings might be different were the impacting event to happen).Fourstudies
show that backcasters expect events to have a greater hedonic impact than do
forecasters, largely becausethey thinkmoreabouttheimpactingevent.Thestudies
also reveal that backcasters consider other information that forecasters tend to
ignore.
W
hether choosing between a movie and a play, decid-
ing whether to attend a sports game shortly before
a birthday party, or selecting an indulgent breakfast treat in
anticipation of a tough day at work, consumers are often
guided by how they expect a consumption experience will
make them feel. Indeed, anticipated feelings of pleasure,
satisfaction, and regret determine a wide range of con-
sumption decisions, including those involving monetary
gambles, brand preference, pregnancy tests, dieting, junk
food, overindulgence in alcohol, and more (Mellers and Mc-
Graw 2001; Richard, Van der Plight, and De Vries 1996;
Shiv and Huber 2000; Simonson 1992; Zeelenberg et al.
1997).
How do consumers predict their feelings following a fu-
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ture consumption event? One approach is by forecast-
ing—the consumer ﬁrst considers how she is likely to feel
in response to the event (“I’ll be very unhappy if the Red
Sox lose today”) and then considers the effects of future
circumstances, such as the passage of time and how she is
likely to feel in a future period (“But I’ll probably feel better
in a few days with my birthday coming up”). Forecasting,
as an approach to predicting the hedonic impact of a future
event, has been widely studied in the literature (Coughlan
and Connolly 2001; Dunn, Wilson, and Gilbert 2003; Fin-
kenauer et al. 2007; Gaunt, Sindic, and Leyens 2005; Gilbert
et al. 1998, 2004; Kahneman and Snell 1992; Loewenstein
and Frederick 1997; Mellers 2000; Read and Van Leeuwen
1998; Snell, Gibbs, and Varey 1995; Wilson et al. 2000,
2005). A second approach that we propose for predicting
the hedonic impact of a future event—backcasting—is one
that has received much less attention. In backcasting, the
consumer ﬁrst considers how she is likely to feel in a future
period (“I’m going to be happy in a few days because my
birthday is coming up”) and then considers the effects of
the prior impacting event and the passage of time (“And if
the Red Sox lose today it won’t change that much”). Fore-
casting and backcasting are logically identical approaches
to predicting the feelings following an impacting event: a
consumer ends by making the same prediction using pre-
cisely the same information. However, these approaches re-
verse the order in which consumers consider information
about how they will feel in a future period (“How will I
feel a few days from now?”) and information about the
impacting event (“How will I feel if the Red Sox lose to-
day?”). While they may be logically identical approaches354 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
to making hedonic predictions, the order in which infor-
mation is considered in forecasting versus backcasting is
likely to give rise to signiﬁcant psychological differences,
leading to different hedonic predictions for forecasters and
backcasters, as this research will demonstrate.
In the next section we summarize factors that have been
found to inﬂuence forecasting and propose differences in
the information considered by forecasters and backcasters
and the predictions they will make based on the psycho-
logical processes underlying these approaches to hedonic
prediction. We then present four studies that test our prop-
ositions. Our studies enable us to make the following claims.
First, backcasters and forecasters differ in the extent to
which they consider the information relevant to hedonic
impact predictions. Speciﬁcally, backcasters consider infor-
mation about the impacting event and the future time period
more than forecasters do, whereas they consider information
about the elapsed time between the impacting event and a
future period to a similar extent. Second, these differences
will frequently lead backcasters to make more extreme he-
donic impact predictions than forecasters.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss previous research on hedonic
prediction, which has emphasized a forecasting approach.
We then present our conceptualization of backcasting and
contrast it with forecasting to specify a set of hypotheses
that we test in this research.
Forecasting
Past research on hedonic predictions shows that consum-
ers tend to mispredict their future feelings, typically over-
estimating the intensity and duration of their feelings fol-
lowing the impacting event (for recent reviews, see Gilbert
and Wilson [2007]; Loewenstein and Angner [2003]; and,
in consumer behavior, MacInnis, Patrick, and Park [2006]).
Two primary causes of this impact bias are focalism, where
people overestimate how much they will think about the
impacting event while underestimating the effect of other
events on their thoughts and feelings (Wilson et al. 2000),
and immune neglect, where people fail to appreciate how
readily they will adapt emotionally to the impacting event
and so underestimate how quickly their feelings dissipate
over time (Gilbert et al. 1998; Snell et al. 1995).
We can also express each of these explanations in terms
of predictors’ use of relevant information when making their
predictions. For hedonic predictions (“How will I feel on
my birthday if the Red Sox lose today?”), three types of
information are relevant: information about the impacting
event (“How will I feel if the Red Sox lose today?”), in-
formation about the future period (“How will I feel on my
birthday?”), and information about the elapsed timebetween
the two (“How long is it from today to my birthday?”).
Reexpressing the focalism and immune neglect explanations
in terms of consideration of information, we can say that,
when people predict the hedonic impact of an event, they
tend to consider impacting event information too much and
consider future period information too little (focalism) and
consider elapsed time information too little (immuneneglect).
Although prior research tells us something about how
much people consider these three types of information when
predicting the hedonic impact of an event, that research
has typically emphasized a forecasting approach to hedonic
prediction by (a) explicitly directing participants to fore-
cast—that is, by asking participants to predict their feelings
immediately following an event and then to predict their
feelings in some future period after the event (e.g., in Fin-
kenauer et al. 2007; Gaunt et al. 2005; Gilbert et al. 2004;
Wilson et al. 2000, 2005)—or (b) asking participants to
consider the hedonic impact ofacurrenteventinsomefuture
period (e.g., in Coughlan and Connolly 2001; Dunn et al.
2003; Gilbert et al. 1998; Kahneman and Snell 1992; Loew-
enstein and Frederick 1997; Mellers 2000; Read and Van
Leeuwen 1998; Snell et al. 1995).
How Forecasters and Backcasters Differ
But forecasting is not the only way by which consumers
may predict the hedonic impact of an event. For example,
when forming affective goals (“I want to feel happy to-
morrow for my birthday”), consumers are likely to ﬁrst con-
sider their feelings at the future period before considering
how those feelings might differ if an event occurred (“If I
see the Red Sox today and they lose, that would ruin my
birthday”; also suggested in MacInnis et al. [2006]). We
refer to this prediction method as “backcasting,” inspired
by another literature in which subjects consider the impact
of events on the future, that of strategic planning, which
discusses two similar prediction approaches (e.g., Holmberg
and Robert 2000; Noori et al. 1999). A manager backcasts
by identifying a desired future state and then considering
which of several strategies in the present is most likely to
bring that state about, and a managerforecastsbyidentifying
several strategies in the present and then considering the
different future states that each strategy is likely to cause.
(Also see Morris and Ward [2005] for similar planning ap-
proaches invoked by individuals solving cognitive tasks.)
Forecasting and backcasting are logically identical meth-
ods for consumers to predict their future feelings after a
consumption event: in both cases a consumer ends by mak-
ing the same prediction of his or her feelings in a particular
future state given the occurrence of the event, and in both
cases the person has and can use precisely the same infor-
mation. Nonetheless, the two methods reverse the order in
which consumers consider information about how they will
feel in a future period (“How will I feel on my birthday?”)
and information about the impacting event (“How will I feel
if the Red Sox lose today?”), and although the order of
information makes no logical difference in a prediction such
as this, it can make a signiﬁcant psychological difference.
How will backcasters’ hedonic predictions differ from
those of forecasters? We expect that backcasters will fre-
quently make more extreme hedonic predictions than fore-
casters will because of differences in how they considerFORECASTING AND BACKCASTING 355
relevant information. First, we expect that backcasters are
likely to consider information about the impacting event
more than forecasters, leading them to make more extreme
hedonic predictions for both positive and negative impacting
events. People typically weight the unique aspects of the
subject of a comparison more heavily than the referent of
the comparison (Dunning and Parpal 1989; Tversky 1977;
Tversky and Gati 1978), and the subject and referent differ
for forecasting and backcasting. A forecaster ﬁrst considers
her hedonic response to an impacting event (the referent)
and then considers the effects of the passage of time (the
subject). A backcaster ﬁrst considers how she is likely to
feel in a future period (the referent) and then considers the
effects of the prior occurrence of the impacting event and
the passage of time (the subject). This implies that consum-
ers will consider impacting event information more when
backcasting than when forecasting.
Second, we expect that information about the impacting
event will have more impact on hedonic predictions than
the other information they consider. As past research on the
impact bias shows, people often ignore information about
the future period (Lam et al. 2005; Wilson et al. 2000) and
misunderstand how quickly feelings dissipate with elapsed
time (Gilbert et al. 1998; Snell et al. 1995), which causes
them to overestimate the hedonic impact of events. There
are likely to be limits to this difference in the impact of
impacting event, elapsed time, and future period informa-
tion; for example, with very long elapsed times (e.g., years)
and unusual future periods (e.g., the birth of a child), the
relative inﬂuence of impacting event information may be
small. Nonetheless, in many circumstances we expect that
the impacting event will have a greater inﬂuence on pre-
dictors than information about the future period and elapsed
time.
In combination, these two arguments lead to our ﬁrst two
hypotheses:
H1: Backcasters will make moreextremehedonicpre-
dictions than forecasters for both positive and
negative impacting events.
H2: This difference in predictions will occur because
backcasters considerimpactingeventinformation
more than forecasters do.
Although predictors tend to ignore information about the
future period, they will incorporate this information into
their hedonic predictions when forced to consider it (Lam
et al. 2005; Wilson et al. 2000). This suggests that back-
casters, who ﬁrst consider their feelings in a future period,
are likely to show greater consideration of future period
information than forecasters in the hedonic predictions they
make. Considering this information could change hedonic
predictions in one of two ways. Predictors may either expect
that events in the future period will distract them from think-
ing about the impacting event (“At my birthdaypartyIwon’t
have time to think about the Red Sox losing”; Wilson et al.
2000) or expect that their feelings in the future period will
add to their feelings following the impacting event (“My
birthday party will help me feel better if the Red Sox lose,
and if the Red Sox win, my party will make me even
happier”; Linville and Fischer 1991). Given this uncertainty
in the effect on hedonic predictions, we simply hypothesize
that:
H3: Backcasters will consider future period infor-
mation more than forecasterswillinmakingtheir
hedonic impact predictions.
Finally, forecasters and backcasters obtain information
about the elapsed time between the impacting event and the
future period at the same point. Backcasters ﬁrst consider
future period and then impacting event information, and
forecasters ﬁrst consider impacting event and then future
period information, but information about both the timing
of the impacting event and the timing of the future period
is needed to infer elapsed time information (“There are three
days between the Red Sox game and my birthday”). Since
they will obtain this information atthe samepoint,weexpect
that backcasters and forecasters will consider the elapsed
time information to a similar extent.
H4: Backcasters and forecasters will not differ in their
consideration of elapsed time information.
We tested these hypotheses in four studies in which par-
ticipants were guided to make hedonic predictions by fore-
casting or backcasting, and we examined the inﬂuence of
three types of information (impacting event information,
future period information, and elapsed time information) on
those predictions.
STUDY 1A
In this ﬁrst study, we sought to discover what predictors
think about when making hedonic predictions. Participants
predicted how they would feel either 1 or 2 weeks hence if
a positive impacting event (winning funds for car expenses)
were to happen shortly. Before making this prediction, fore-
casters ﬁrst predicted how they would feel when the im-
pacting event occurred, and backcasters ﬁrst predicted how
they would feel in general either 1 or 2 weeks hence. Par-
ticipants then listed the thoughts they had while making
predictions. We expected that backcasters and forecasters
would differ in the predictions they made and in the infor-
mation they considered. In particular, we expectedthatback-
casters would make more extreme predictions and would
think more about impacting event information (relative to
other information) than forecasters would.
Method
Participants. Participants were students who were re-
cruited in a public place on the University of Minnesota
campus to complete a questionnaire in exchange for candy.
Of the 99 participants who completed the questionnaire, 58356 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
were female and 41 were male. The participants’ mean age
was 21.2 years ( ). SD p 4.3 years
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to a
predictor condition (backcaster or forecaster) and an elapsed
time condition (1 week or 2 weeks). All participants an-
swered three questions. First, they all answered a baseline
question about their usual mood: “How do you usually feel
in general?” Second, participants in the forecaster condition
estimated their feelings immediately after the impacting
event (“Imagine that you bought a used car from a dealer
a few months ago. Later today you ﬁnd out from the dealer
that you have won $1,000 in a draw for recent customers
to spend on any expenses for your car (to use when and
where you want). How willyou feel ingeneralatthemoment
you ﬁnd that out?”), whereas participants in the backcaster
condition estimated their feelings in the future period (“How
will you feel in general 1 week [2 weeks] from today?”).
Third and ﬁnally, all participants predicted how they would
feel in the future period if the impacting event occurred
(their hedonic predictions). Speciﬁcally, they were asked:
“Imagine that you bought a used car from a dealer a few
months ago. Later today you ﬁnd out from the dealer that
you have won $1,000 in a draw for recent customers to
spend on any expenses for your car (to use when and where
you want). How will you feel in general 1 week [2 weeks]
from today?” Participants answered these questions using a
9-point scale ( , 1 p very unhappy 5 p neither happy nor
, ). Participants then immediately unhappy 9 p very happy
described “every thought or idea that you were considering
as you tried to predict your feelings.” To ensure that par-
ticipants considered the information in the properorder,each
question was presented on a new page of a paper booklet.
Results
Analyses of baseline mood measures in this and subse-
quent studies occasionally revealed differences between
conditions, and thus they were used as covariates in this and
subsequent studies (as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell
[1996]).
Participants’ hedonic predictions were submitted to a 2
(predictor: forecaster or backcaster) # 2 (elapsed time: 1
week or 2 weeks) ANCOVA with the baseline mood ratings
as the covariate. The analysis revealed only a main effect
of predictor ( , , ), such F(1,94) p 14.73 p ! .001 eta p .37
that backcasters ( ) predicted greater inﬂuence of M p 7.73
the impacting event than did forecasters ( ). M p 6.85
Backcasters and forecasters made different hedonic pre-
dictions. Did they also differ in what they thought about
when making those predictions? Six participants did not list
any thoughts. Of the remaining 93 participants, 89 (96%)
mentioned the impacting event in some form: 39 described
thoughts focused only on the impacting event (i.e., winning
$1,000 for car expenses), and 50 mentioned the impacting
event alongside some mention of the future. For example,
one participant described thinking, “What else would be
going on in a week? Would the happiness from winning last
the week?” Participants’ thoughts were coded, by a coder
who was blind to condition, as being focused on (a) the event
only, (b) the future plus the event, or (c) other. The focus of
participants’ thoughts varied by condition (
2 x (2,93) p
, ), such that backcasters focused more on the 9.60 p p .008
impacting event alone (event only: 26 of 93; future plus
event: 21 of 93; other: 0 of 93) than did forecasters (event
only: 13 of 93; future plus event: 29 of 93; other: 4 of 93).
This difference remained signiﬁcant when the “other” cat-
egory was excluded ( ). p p .02
Discussion
Backcasters were more likely than forecasters to predict
that a positive event would have considerable hedonic im-
pact in the future, making more extreme hedonic predictions
on average. Backcasters and forecasters also differed in the
thoughts they had when making those predictions. Although
the impacting event was considered by almost all predictors,
backcasters were more likely to focus on the event alone
than were forecasters.
The elapsed time manipulation had no signiﬁcant effects,
perhaps because participants expected the affective impact
of this event to last more than 2 weeks. Alternatively, this
may reﬂect some insensitivity to variation in elapsed time
(Varey and Kahneman 1992).
STUDY 1B
In study 1a, we found that backcasters were more likely
than forecasters to focus on impacting event information
when making hedonic predictions. In this study, we contin-
ued our exploration of predictors’ thoughts by explicitly
asking participants the extent to which they thought about
the effects of the other two types of information relevant to
hedonic predictions: elapsed time and future period. In ad-
dition, because study 1a used only a positive event, it is not
clear whether backcasters made more extreme predictions
or more positive predictions than forecasters. In this study
(and in subsequent studies), we used both positive and neg-
ative impacting events.
As in study 1a, backcasters and forecasters ﬁrst predicted
how they would feel following a positive or negative im-
pacting event (winning funds for car expenses or having to
pay for car repairs). Forecasters and backcasters then rated
the extent to which they thought about the effects of elapsed
time and the occurrence of future events on their feelings,
using a measure adapted from research by Igou (2004) and
Wilson and his colleagues (2000). We expected that back-
casters would think about future period information more
than forecasters, but that backcasters and forecasters would
think about elapsed time information to a similar extent.
Method
Participants. Participants were students who were re-
cruited in a public place on the University of Minnesota
campus to complete a questionnaire in exchange for candy.FORECASTING AND BACKCASTING 357
FIGURE 1
PREDICTED FUTURE HAPPINESS FOR IMPACTING EVENTS
IN STUDY 1B
Of the 99 participants who completed the questionnaire, 49
were female and 50 were male. The participants’ mean age
was 20.6 years ( ). SD p 2.17 years
Procedure. Participants who agreed to complete aques-
tionnaire were randomly assigned to a predictor condition
(forecaster or backcaster) and an impacting event condition
(positive or negative). The questionnaire was similar to the
one used in study 1a. Participants ﬁrst answered a baseline
mood question, followed by a question that varied by ex-
perimental condition, followed by the hedonic prediction.
Each question was presented on a new page. For forecasters,
the second question read: “Imagine that you bought a used
car from a dealer a few months ago. Later today you ﬁnd
out from the dealer that you have won $1,000 in a draw for
recent customers to spend on any expenses for your car (to
use when and where you want). [Later today your car breaks
down and you ﬁnd out that the repair, which will take a
couple of days, is going to cost you $1,000.] How will you
feel in general at the moment you ﬁnd that out?” For back-
casters, the second question read “How will you feel in
general 1 week from today?” Third and ﬁnally, all partici-
pants made a prediction of their future feelings given the
occurrence of the impacting event: “Imaginethatyoubought
a used car from a dealer a few months ago. Later today you
ﬁnd out from the dealer that you have won $1,000 in a draw
for recent customers to spend on any expenses for your car
(to use when and where you want). [Later today your car
breaks down and you ﬁnd out that the repair, which will
take a couple of days, is going to cost you $1,000.] How
will you feel in general 1 week from today?” Participants
responded to all questions using a 9-point scale (1 p
,, very unhappy 5 p neither happy nor unhappy 9 p
). very happy
Next, participants rated the extent to which the thoughts
they had while making the hedonic prediction were best
described by each of seven statements. Five of these state-
ments described changes in feelings over time, with the ﬁrst
four adapted from Igou (2004). The statements were (a)n o
feelings last long, (b) happiness and unhappiness are tran-
sitory, (c) some experiences have a lasting inﬂuence on a
person, (d) no experience is so bad that I would not be able
to accept it, and (e) experiences like this have a big impact
on my feelings. The ﬁnal two statements described the ef-
fects of future events and were adapted from Wilson et al.
(2000). They were (f) other things will be happening over
the coming week that will also inﬂuence my feelings and
(g) other things will be happening over the coming week
that will distract me from thinking about this experience.
Participants used a 9-point scale (1 p not thinking this
, ) to respond. at all 9 p thinking this very much
Results
Predictions. Participants’ hedonic predictions were
submitted to a 2 (predictor: forecaster or backcaster) # 2
(impacting event: positive or negative) ANCOVA with
responses to the baseline question used as a covariate.
The analysis revealed a main effect of impacting event
( , , ), which was quali- F(1,94) p 51.51 p ! .001 eta p .59
ﬁed by a predictor # impacting event interaction
( , , ). As ﬁgure 1 shows, F(1,94) p 5.47 p p .02 eta p .25
backcasters predicted a greater inﬂuence of the impacting
event ( , ) than did forecasters M p 7.28 M p 4.46 pos. neg.
( , ). Separate ANCOVAs revealed M p 6.77 M p 5.16 pos. neg.
that the difference between backcasters and forecasters oc-
curred to some degree for both the positive event
( , , ) and the negative F(1,48) p 2.67 p p .11 eta p .23
event ( , , ). F(1,45) p 3.52 p p .07 eta p .27
Thinking about the Effect of Elapsed Time and the
Future Period. The statements that were relevant to both
positive and negative events (i.e., items a, b, c, and e)
showed a weak but consistent pattern in means for both
positive and negative events, such that forecasters thought
more about feelings dissipating (items a and b) and less
about feelings enduring (items c and e) than did backcasters.
Means for these items (collapsed across positive and neg-
ative events) were, for forecasters, , , M p 4.71 M p 4.84 ab
, and ; for backcasters, , M p 5.98 M p 4.71 M p 4.33 ce a
, , and . (Item d was only M p 4.54 M p 6.52 M p 5.44 bc e
relevant for negative events and showed this pattern for
those events only.) The two dissipation items were mod-
erately correlated, as were the two endurance items (median
correlations across conditions: ; ), but r p .33 r p .37 diss. end.
correlations between dissipation and endurance items were
low and positive (median ). That is,peoplewhowere r p .15
thinking more about their feelings dissipating were not nec-
essarily thinking less about their feelings enduring; rather,
those thoughts were relatively independent. As such, we
constructed separate “feelings dissipate” and “feelings en-
dure” variables by averaging the relevant items. A 2 (pre-
dictor: forecaster or backcaster) # 2 (impacting event: pos-
itive or negative) ANOVA on each of these variables
revealed only a marginally signiﬁcant effect of predictor for
the feelings endure variable ( , , F(1,95) p 2.91 p p .09358 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
FIGURE 2
PREDICTORS’ THINKING ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF ELAPSED
TIME AND FUTURE PERIOD IN STUDY 1B
), such that backcasters thought more about eta p .17
their feelings enduring than did forecasters (backcasters:
, ; forecasters: , M p 4.44 M p 5.98 M p 4.77 diss. end. diss.
; see ﬁg. 2.) M p 5.34 end.
The same analysis for each of the items relevant to future
period revealed only a signiﬁcant effect of predictor for item
f (“Other things will be happening over the coming week
that will also inﬂuence my feelings”; , F(1,95) p 4.06
, ), such that backcasters thought more p p .05 eta p .20
about this effect of future events ( ) than did fore- M p 6.56
casters ( ). Means for item g (“Other things will M p 5.71
be happening over the coming week that will distract me
from thinking about this experience”) were M p 6.22 back.
and (see ﬁg. 2). M p 5.90 fore.
Discussion
Backcasters were once again more likely than forecasters
to predict that an event would have considerable hedonic
impact in a future period, making more extreme hedonic
predictions on average. This was generally the case for both
positive and negative events. Backcasters thought more
about the inﬂuence of future events on their feelings and
(to some degree) more about their feelings enduring over
time than did forecasters. However, backcasters and fore-
casters were similar in the extent to which they thought
about their feelings dissipating over time and about the dis-
tracting effects of future events.
The relative independence of the endurance and dissi-
pation variables was surprising. It may be that the endurance
variable in part represents thinking about the impacting
event, while the dissipation variable more closely represents
thinking about elapsed time. If so, theseresultsareconsistent
with study 1a, which found that backcasters focus more on
the impacting event when making their impact predictions
than do forecasters.
STUDY 2
In studies 1a and 1b, we found that backcasters make
more extreme hedonic predictions than forecasters, and they
differ in the information they consider when making their
predictions. Backcasters think more than forecasters about
impacting event and future period information, while both
types of predictors think to a similar extent about elapsed
time information (in its effect on dissipation of feelings). In
both these studies, the extent of thinking about impacting
event, elapsed time, and future period information is mea-
sured, not manipulated. This makes it difﬁcult to separate
the inﬂuences of these three types of information, leading
to ambiguity in interpretation of their effects on predictions.
This is especially the case as these types of information may
be naturally confounded in hedonic predictions. For ex-
ample, people usually, and sometimes incorrectly, expect
more intense events to affect their feelings for longer (Gil-
bert et al. 2004), confounding the effects of impacting event
and elapsed time information. We address these issues in
study 2.
In this study, we used a method similar to the one used
in the previous studies. Speciﬁcally, backcasters and fore-
casters were asked to predict how they would feel in a future
period given the occurrence of a positive or negative im-
pacting event (performing well or poorly on an exam). In
addition, we manipulated (a) the elapsed time between the
impacting event and future period and (b) the valence of
the future period, to examine the separate effects of these
three types of information on hedonic predictions. Consis-
tent with our ﬁndings in studies 1a and 1b, we expected
that backcasters would be more inﬂuenced than forecasters
by information about the impacting event and the future
period and that they would be similarly inﬂuenced by
elapsed time.
Method
Participants. Participants were students who were re-
cruited in a public place on the Harvard University campus
to complete a questionnaire in exchange for candy. Of the
239 participants, 119 were female and 120 were male. The
participants’ mean age was 20.2 years ( ). SD p 1.3 years
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of 16 experimental conditions that included a predictor con-
dition (forecaster or backcaster). We also manipulated the
valence of the impacting event (positive or negative), the
valence of the future period (positive or negative), and the
elapsed time (long or short) between the impacting event
and the future period. We manipulated the valence of the
impacting event by using good or bad performance on an
exam as the impacting event. We manipulated the valence
of the future period by having it fall on a Saturday or a
Monday. Research has shown that people expect to feel
worse on Mondays than on any other day of the week (Stone
et al. 1985). Finally, we manipulated elapsed time by havingFORECASTING AND BACKCASTING 359
FIGURE 3
PREDICTED FUTURE HAPPINESS AFTER DIFFERENT
ELAPSED TIMES FOR IMPACTING EVENTS IN STUDY 2
FIGURE 4
PREDICTED FUTURE HAPPINESS FOR DIFFERENT FUTURE
PERIODS FOR IMPACTING EVENTS IN STUDY 2
the future period occur 3 days or 10 days after the impacting
event. In this study, we used two baseline mood questions:
one that asked participants to rate their current mood and
one that asked them to rate their usual mood.
The question order was similar to previous studies. For
example, a forecaster in the positive impacting event/posi-
tive future period/short elapsed time condition answered
the following four questions: (1a) “How do you feel in
general right now?” (1b) “How do you usually feel in gen-
eral?” (2) “Imagine you ﬁnd out on Wednesday, March 7th
that your score on the last test you took is much better than
you expected. How will you feel in general at the moment
you ﬁnd that out?” (3) “Imagine you ﬁnd out on Wednesday,
March 7th that your score on the last test you took is much
better than you expected. How will you feel in general on
Saturday, March 10th?” For backcasters in the same con-
dition, question 2 was replaced with “How will you feel in
general on Saturday, March 10th?” For the negative event
conditions, “better” was replaced with “worse,” and for the
Monday conditions, “Wednesday, March 7th” was replaced
with “Friday, March 9th” so that the elapsed time was still
3 or 10 days for the two Monday dates. Questions 1a and
1b were presented on the ﬁrst page of the booklet, with
questions 2 and 3 each on subsequent pages.
Results
Participants’ hedonic predictions were submitted to a 2
(predictor: forecaster or backcaster) # 2 (impacting event:
positive or negative) # 2 (future period: positive or neg-
ative) # 2 (elapsed time: short or long) ANCOVA with
responses to the baseline questions used as covariates.
The analysis revealed interactions consistent with our re-
sults in studies 1a and 1b. First, as shown in ﬁgure 3, the
predictor # impacting event interaction was signiﬁcant
( , , ). Just as in studies F(1,221) p 4.71 p p .03 eta p .14
1a and 1b, backcasters predicted a greater impact of the
event than did forecasters (collapsing across other condi-
tions, backcasters: , ; forecasters: M p 7.36 M p 5.14 pos. neg.
, ). Second, the analysis also M p 6.58 M p 5.19 pos. neg.
revealed an impacting event # elapsed time interaction
( , , ), such that both F(1,221) p 8.67 p p .004 eta p .19
backcasters and forecasters expected the event to have less
impact after a longer time had elapsed. The predictor #
impacting event # elapsed time interaction was not sig-
niﬁcant ( ), indicating that both groups were inﬂu- p p .60
enced to a similar extent by elapsed time.
As ﬁgure 4 shows, the analysis also revealed a predictor
# future period interaction ( , , F(1,221) p 7.65 p p .006
), such that backcasters expected to be happier eta p .18
on a Saturday than on a Monday (for backcasters, collaps-
ing across other conditions: , ; M p 5.95 M p 6.61 Mon. Sat.
, , ), but forecasters did F(1,109) p 4.64 p p .03 eta p .20
not ( , ; ). In other words, M p 6.03 M p 5.79 p p .12 Mon. Sat.
only backcasters considered the future period when pre-
dicting their happiness following an impacting event. No
other interactions were signiﬁcant ( ). p’s 1 .25
Consistent with study 1b, we also examined the results
separately for positive and negative impacting events. Sep-
arate ANCOVAs revealed that the effects of elapsed time
were only signiﬁcant for the negative event (F(1,109) p
, , ), suggesting that all predictors 17.36 p ! .001 eta p .37
expected the hedonic impact of the positive event to have
largely dissipated after 3 days but that they expected the
hedonic impact of the negative event to endure beyond 3
days (though with considerably less impact after 10 days).
It may be that the students in this study expect that getting
a worse score than they expected in the class would be a
more affectively intense experience than getting a better
score than they expected and thus would have a more en-
during impact on their feelings. Alternatively, this asym-
metry in impact of positive and negative events is also con-
sistent with some previous work showing that people expect360 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
the impact of negative events to endure longer than those
of positive events (Kermer et al. 2006).
The predictor # future period interaction was signiﬁcant
or marginally signiﬁcant for both positive and negative
events ( , , ). This result, in F’s 1 3.18 p’s ! .08 eta’s 1 .17
conjunction with the ﬁnding that neither the predictor #
future period # impacting event interaction nor the future
period # impacting event interaction for backcasters or
forecasters alone were signiﬁcant ( ), suggests that F’s ! 1
the effect of the valence of the future period was similar for
both positive and negative events. In other words, for back-
casters the valence of the future period had an additive effect
on hedonic predictions, such that they predicted greater hap-
piness on Saturday and less happiness on Monday, whereas
for forecasters the valence of the future period had no sig-
niﬁcant effect.
Discussion
Backcasters were more inﬂuenced by the impacting event
and the future period than forecasters were: backcasters
made more extreme hedonic predictions on average for both
positive and negative events and made more positive he-
donic predictions for a positive future period (a Saturday)
than a negative future period (a Monday), but forecasters
did not. The inﬂuence of elapsed time information was sim-
ilar for both groups: that is, both groups expected the he-
donic impact of the event to dissipate over time (their impact
predictions after 10 days were less extreme than after 3
days), and this expected dissipation was similar for back-
casters and forecasters. These results correspond closely to
the thought-listing and self-reported ratings in studies 1a
and 1b, which, taken together, suggested that backcasters
consider and are inﬂuenced by the impacting event and the
future period more than forecasters and that both consider
elapsed time and are similarly inﬂuenced by it.
The results of the current study also imply that backcas-
ters’ more extreme hedonic predictions are caused by their
greater consideration ofimpactingeventinformationrelative
to forecasters, not by their consideration of future period or
elapsed time information. Backcasters do consider future
period information more than forecasters, and considering
a positive future period causes them to make more positive
(more extreme) hedonic predictions for positive events.
However, it also causes backcasters to make more positive
(less extreme) hedonic predictions for negative events. Also,
while elapsed time information inﬂuences both backcasters
and forecasters, leading them make more moderate predic-
tions, it inﬂuences both to a similar extent.
STUDY 3
While the lack of difference in consideration of elapsed
time information implies that it is backcasters’ greater con-
sideration of impacting information that leads them to make
more extreme hedonic predictions than forecasters, we
sought to conﬁrm this in study 3 by manipulating impacting
event information (both valence and intensity)whileholding
elapsed time constant. People have little difﬁculty predicting
the valence of the affect (negative or positive) they will feel
following an event, but they have trouble predicting the
intensity of that affect (Wilson and Gilbert 2003). By using
impacting events that differ in intensity as well as valence,
we hoped to create a more stringent test of predictors’ use
of impacting event information. If backcasters make more
extreme hedonic predictions because they consider impact
event information more than forecasters do, then we would
expect backcasters to be more inﬂuenced than forecasters
by both the intensity and valence manipulations.
In addition, in study 3 we included a group of “unguided
predictors”—that is, participants who were not guided to
make backcasts or forecasts—to determine whether their
hedonic predictions were more like those of backcasters or
forecasters. Therefore, in this study, three predictor groups
(backcasters, forecasters, and unguideds)predictedhowthey
would feel 2 weeks after an extremely positive, moderately
positive, moderately negative, or extremely negative event.
Method
Participants. Participants were students who were re-
cruited in a public place on the University of Minnesota
campus to complete a questionnaire in exchange for candy.
Of the 181 participants who completed the questionnaire,
100 were female, 77 were male, and four did not specify
their gender. The participants’ mean age was 22.5 years
() . SD p 5.2 years
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of 12 experiment conditions that included three predictor
conditions (backcaster, forecaster, or unguided). Wealso ma-
nipulated impacting event valence (positive or negative) and
impacting event intensity (moderate or extreme) by using
performance on an exam as the impacting event. The ques-
tions and order were similar to those used in study 2, except
that (a) participants’ hedonic predictions concerned either
a moderate impacting event (“You ﬁnd out later today that
your score on the last midterm you took is much higher
[lower] than you expected”) or an extreme impacting event
(“You ﬁnd out later today that your scoreon thelastmidterm
you took is the highest [lowest] in the class”), (b)w ei n -
cluded an unguided condition for which question 2 was
omitted, and (c) participants were asked to predict their
feelings “2 weeks from today” rather than on a speciﬁc date.
So, for example, a forecaster in the positive/extreme con-
dition answered the following four questions: (1a) “How do
you feel in general right now?” (1b) “How do you usually
feel in general?” (2) “Imagine you ﬁnd out later today that
your score on the last midterm you took is the highest in
the class. How will you feel in general at the moment you
ﬁnd that out?” (3) Imagine you ﬁnd out later today that
your score on the last midterm you took is the highest in
the class. How will you feel in general 2 weeks from today?”
For backcasters in the same condition, question 2 was re-
placed with “How will you feel in general 2 weeks from
today?” For unguideds, question 2 was omitted.FORECASTING AND BACKCASTING 361
FIGURE 5
PREDICTED FUTURE HAPPINESS FOR IMPACTING EVENTS
IN STUDY 3
Results
Forecasters and Backcasters. Participants’ hedonic
predictions were submitted to a 2 (predictor: forecaster or
backcaster) # 2 (impacting event valence: positive or neg-
ative) # 2 (impacting event intensity: moderate or extreme)
ANCOVA with responses to the baseline questions used as
covariates. The analysis revealed a main effect of impacting
event valence ( , , ), F(1,111) p 37.69 p ! .001 eta p .50
which was qualiﬁed by a predictor # impacting event va-
lence interaction ( , , ). F(1,111) p 7.04 p p .009 eta p .24
Backcasters were once again more likely than forecasters to
predict that the impacting event would have a considerable
impact (collapsing across intensity conditions, for backcas-
ters: , ; for forecasters: M p 7.33 M p 5.32 M p pos. neg. pos.
, ; see ﬁg. 5). Separate ANCOVAsrevealed 6.65 M p 5.69 neg.
that this difference in backcasters’ and forecasters’ predic-
tions occurred for both the positive and negative events
(positive event: , , ; neg- F(1,55) p 3.78 p p .06 eta p .25
ative event: , , ). F(1,54) p 2.91 p p .09 eta p .23
There was also a marginal impacting event valence #
impacting event intensity interaction ( , F(1,111) p 3.35
, ), which was qualiﬁed by a predictor # p p .07 eta p .17
impacting event valence # impacting event intensity in-
teraction ( , , ). Separate F(1,111) p 4.62 p p .03 eta p .20
ANCOVAs for backcasters and forecasters illuminated the
nature of this interaction: the impacting event valence #
impacting event intensity interaction was signiﬁcant for
backcasters ( , , ) but not F(1,55) p 6.61 p p .01 eta p .33
for forecasters ( ). In other words, backcasters’ pre- p p .74
dictions were more strongly inﬂuenced by information about
the valence and intensity of the impacting event than were
forecasters’ predictions (see ﬁg. 5).
Furthermore, a 2 (impacting event valence) # 2 (im-
pacting event intensity) ANCOVA on forecasters’ ratings
of the initial impact of the event (i.e., question 2) also re-
vealed no effects of intensity ( ). In short, forecasters’ F’s ! 1
ratings of the initial impact and the future impact of the
impacting event were not inﬂuenced by information about
the intensity of that event. This null ﬁnding is unlikely to
be explained as a ceiling or ﬂoor effect. For example, fore-
casters’ standard deviations for their ratings of the initial
impact and the future impact of extreme events were similar
to or larger than those for the moderate events; forecasters’
mean initial impact rating for positive events was slightly
higher for the moderate event than for the extreme event;
and their initial impact rating for the negative events was
signiﬁcantly higher than 1, the lowest point on the scale
(, p 3.00). M p 2.86 M ext. mod.
Unguideds. As shown in ﬁgure 5, unguided participants
resembled backcasters more than forecasters, both in terms
of their hedonic predictions and in the inﬂuence of infor-
mation about the intensity of the impacting events. A fo-
cused ANCOVA comparing unguideds with forecasters re-
vealed the same interaction found when backcasters were
compared with forecasters (predictor # impacting event
valence: , , ; predictor F(1,110) p 4.18 p p .04 eta p .19
# impacting event valence # impacting event intensity:
, , ). Furthermore, these F(1,110) p 5.02 p p .03 eta p .21
interactions were not signiﬁcant in a similar analysis com-
paring unguideds with backcasters ( ). Also as for p’s 1 .53
backcasters, a focused impacting event valence#impacting
event intensity ANCOVA on the hedonic predictions of un-
guideds alone revealed a signiﬁcant impacting event valence
# impacting event intensity interaction ( , F(1,54) p 6.34
, ), suggesting that unguideds’ predictions p p .01 eta p .32
were also inﬂuenced by information about both the valence
and intensity of the impacting events.
Discussion
Backcasters were once again more likely than forecasters
to predict that an event would have a considerable hedonic
impact in a future period, making more extreme hedonic
predictions on average. Backcasters were also more inﬂu-
enced than forecasters by information about the valence and
intensity of the future event. This result is consistent with
study 1a, in which backcasters thought more exclusively
than forecasters about the impacting event. Unguided pre-
dictors were similar to backcasters in both the predictions
they made and in the inﬂuence of impacting event infor-
mation. While the lack of differences observed between
backcasters and unguided predictors does not prove that
unguided predictors were backcasting, the differences be-
tween forecasters and unguided predictors at least suggests
that the latter were not forecasting.
In addition, the lack of an effect of the intensity of the
impacting event on forecasters is consistent with our ar-
gument, following the results of studies 1b and 2, that a
differential use of elapsed time information by forecasters
and backcasters is unlikely to account for backcasters’ more
extreme hedonic predictions. Given the likely confound of362 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
intensity and duration of feelings in hedonic prediction, it
is conceivable that the same elapsed time (2 weeks in this
study) would have a different effect on hedonic predictions
for extreme and moderate events, as the effects of extreme
events may be expected to endure longer. Therefore, back-
casters’ more extreme hedonic predictions could be ex-
plained if forecasters are more inﬂuenced by elapsed time
information than backcasters. If this were the case in the
present study, forecasters should have shown a greater in-
ﬂuence of theintensity andvalencemanipulationsthanback-
casters. Instead, backcasters showed a greater inﬂuence of
these manipulations than forecasters, which reinforces our
suggestion that it is the differential inﬂuence of impacting
information that causes backcasters to make more extreme
hedonic predictions than forecasters.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research compared two methods by which
consumers may predict how they will feel if an impacting
event occurs: backcasting (whereby consumersﬁrstconsider
their feelings in a future period and then consider how those
feelings might be different if the impacting event occurred)
and forecasting (whereby consumers ﬁrst consider how they
would feel at the time an impacting event occurs and then
consider howthosefeelingsmightchangeinafutureperiod).
We guided participants to make predictions by one of these
methods so that we could determine whether the methods
produced similar or different predictions. We hypothesized
that backcasters and forecasters would differ in the extent
to which they consider the information relevant to hedonic
impact predictions, leading them to make different predic-
tions. Speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that backcasters would
consider information about the impacting event and the fu-
ture time period more than forecasters do, whereas they
would consider information about the elapsed time between
the impacting event and a future period to a similar extent.
Finally, we hypothesized that the relatively powerful inﬂu-
ence of impacting event information on hedonic predictions
would lead backcasters to make more extreme hedonic im-
pact predictions than forecasters.
What have we learned? The data across four studies con-
sistently supported our hypotheses. First, in all four studies,
backcasters and forecasters made different predictions when
provided with the same information; speciﬁcally, backcas-
ters were more likely than forecasters to predict thatanevent
would have considerable hedonic impact in the future, mak-
ing more extreme hedonic predictions on average. Second,
backcasters and forecasters considered different kinds of
information to different extents.Speciﬁcally,backcastersap-
peared to be more likely than forecasters to consider the
nature of the impacting event and their feelings in a future
period and no less likely to consider the inﬂuence of elapsed
time. Third, the difference in backcasters’ and forecasters’
predictions was caused primarily by the difference in their
consideration of the impacting event.
These results contribute to the growing literature on an-
ticipated affect in consumer behavior by examining the ef-
fects on hedonic predictions of different prediction ap-
proaches. Given the demonstrated inﬂuence of anticipated
affect on choice and preference, behavioral intentions, and
consumer satisfaction (Patrick, MacInnis, and Park 2007;
Richard et al. 1996; Shiv and Huber 2000; Simonson 1992),
these results will be of interest to both researchers and prac-
titioners in consumer behavior.
Why Do Backcasters Predict a Greater Impact of
Events on Their Future Feelings than Forecasters?
Backcasters make more extreme hedonic predictions pri-
marily because they consider the impacting information to
a greater extent than forecasters do. They described thinking
more exclusively about the impacting event than forecasters
did (study 1a), and variation in impacting event information
inﬂuenced backcasters’ predictions more than it inﬂuenced
forecasters’ predictions (studies 2 and 3).
A potential alternative (or additional) explanation, that
backcasters and forecasters make different impact predic-
tions because they consider elapsed time information to a
different extent, was not supported. While they made dif-
ferent hedonic predictions, backcasters and forecasters did
not differ in the extent to which they thought about the
dissipation of their feelings over time (study 1b), and while
both backcasters and forecasters moderated their predictions
with elapsed time after an impacting event, they did so to
the same degree (study 2).
Backcasters consider the future period more than fore-
casters do. They thought more about the inﬂuence of future
events on their feelings (study 1b) and adjusted theirhedonic
predictions accordingly, so their predictions were more pos-
itive for a positive future period and more negative for a
negative future period (study 3). This additive effect of the
valence of a future period is consistent with some research
on how feelings for differentexperiencesarecombined(Lin-
ville and Fischer 1991). However, it contrasts with other
research in which considering a future period had a diluting
effect, moderating hedonic predictions (Wilson et al. 2000).
Whether considering the future period has an additive or a
diluting effect probably depends on how that future period
is considered. In the Wilson et al. (2000) studies, before
making their hedonic predictions for the impact of an event
in a future period, participants ﬁrst estimated the time they
would spend on 10 or more activities in that future period
(e.g., studying, socializing with friends). Considering the
future period in this way prompted participants to think
about the diverting effects of those future activities, which
caused them to moderate their hedonic predictions. This
moderation occurred when participants considered either af-
fectively neutral or valenced activities. In contrast, in the
current research, participants were asked to estimate their
feelings in a positively or negatively valenced future period
(a Saturday or a Monday) before making their hedonic pre-
dictions, presumably focusing their attention on affective
information about the future period. This caused them to
add their positive or negative feelings for that future periodFORECASTING AND BACKCASTING 363
to their hedonic predictions. While considering a future pe-
riod can have either an additive effect (as in our studies) or
a diluting effect (as in the Wilson et al. studies) on hedonic
predictions, neither effect can account for backcasters’ more
extreme hedonic predictions for both positive and negative
impacting events.
These differences in the information backcastersandfore-
casters consider and the predictions they make suggest that
simply changing the order in which consumers think about
a potential consumption event and an upcoming future time
period can markedly change their expectations about the
affective consequences of the event. Just as we can change
performance and other consumer expectations using com-
munications (Crosby and Taylor 1981), marketers should be
able to change consumers’ hedonic expectations simply by
prompting consumers to think ahead to the future before
considering a consumption event. For example, an adver-
tisement in the midst of a snowy winter might read: “How
are you going to be feeling in frigid February? Imagine you
take a sun-ﬁlled Caribbean cruise next week. Now imagine
how you will feel in February. Help yourself through the
winter . . . book a cruise today.” Consumers reading this
advertisement should expect the cruise to make them feel
happier in February, more so than should consumers who
read an advertisement that prompts them to think ﬁrst about
the cruise before they consider how it will make them feel
later.
But why do backcasters and forecasters consider different
information to different extents? The current work dem-
onstrates order effects for hedonic predictions, where pre-
senting relevant information in different orders results in
different hedonic predictions. As such, it adds to other con-
sumer research demonstrating order or serial position effects
(Bu ¨yu ¨kkurt 1986; Gurhan-Canli, Mick, and Brucks 2003;
Haugtvedt and Wegener 1994; Hovland 1957; Jedidi and
Jacoby 1997; Kardes and Herr 1990; Miller and Campbell
1959; Pieters and Bijmolt 1997). However, unlike many
other results demonstrating serial position effects, a simple
explanation based only on the primacy or recency of the
information presented is inadequate to explain the current
results.
First, consider a primacy explanation: that consumers will
simply weigh information presented ﬁrst more heavily.
However, in our studies, the information ﬁrst encountered
by forecasters and backcasters (the impacting event and fu-
ture period respectively) is weighted relatively heavily only
by backcasters. Second, consider a recency explanation: that
consumers will simply weight information presented last
more heavily. However, here, the information encountered
last by forecastersand backcasters(futureperiodandelapsed
time for forecasters; impacting event and elapsed time for
backcasters) is again weighted heavily only by backcasters
(future period) or is weighted similarly by both (elapsed
time). So neither a simple primacy nor recency explanation
is sufﬁcient to explain the results we obtain.
Relative to backcasters, forecasters neglect the future pe-
riod in their impact predictions. Consistent with focalism
research (Wilson et al. 2000), we have suggested that back-
casters’ greater consideration of future period information
occurs because they are compelled to consider their feelings
in a futureperiod beforetheymaketheirhedonicpredictions.
This difference in consideration of future period information
may also be due to forecasters using a correction process
to make their hedonic predictions, as suggested by some
earlier research in hedonic prediction (Gilbert, Gill,andWil-
son 2002). In that research, participants made impact pre-
dictions by ﬁrst considering their response to an event (eat-
ing spaghetti) before correcting forthecircumstances(eating
it in the morning or evening). Such correction tends to be
insufﬁcient (Epley and Gilovich 2001; Gilbert 2002; Tver-
sky and Kahneman 1974) and contributed to the impact bias
observed in those studies. Similarly, in our studies, fore-
casters are asked to ﬁrst consider the impacting event and
then consider the circumstances (the future period and the
elapsed time). Insufﬁcient correction, asseeninthespaghetti
studies, could also help explain their relative neglect of fu-
ture period information here.
The fact that backcasters show a greater inﬂuence of the
information they consider second (i.e., the impacting event
information) suggests that a similar correction account of
backcasting is unlikely. We have suggested an alternative
possibility for the process involved in backcasting, based
on how people make comparisons (Tversky 1977; Tversky
and Gati 1978). That is, when comparing a future following
the occurrence of an impacting event (the subject of the
comparison) against a future where the event has not oc-
curred (the referent of the comparison), a backcaster weights
the unique aspects of the subject of the comparison (e.g.,
how seeing the Red Sox lose today will make her feel) more
heavily than the referent (e.g., how she will feel on her
birthday in a few days). As a result, the impacting event
has a powerful inﬂuence on backcasters’ predictions.
We can apply a similar account to our unguided predictors
(in study 3) who compare a future following the occurrence
of an impacting event (the subjectof thecomparison)against
their baseline mood (what they estimate ﬁrst and so the
referent of the comparison). Like backcasters, these un-
guided predictors show a powerful inﬂuence of the im-
pacting event information, and they make similar hedonic
predictions to backcasters. Whilethisaccountofbackcasting
(and of our unguided predictors) ﬁts our results quite well,
additional research is needed to determine whether this ac-
count of backcasting holds true.
In What Contexts Will Consumers Use
Backcasting and Forecasting?
In our studies, we explicitly asked participants to make
hedonic predictions. But in what contexts might consumers
spontaneously use forecasting or backcasting to make them?
It seems reasonable to suspect that consumers will naturally
begin most hedonic prediction tasks by contemplating the
temporal period in which they are primarily interested. For
example, when making future plans, a consumer probably364 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
begins by simulating the future (“I’m looking forward to
my birthday in a few days”) and only then considers how
current events might alter those simulations (“And if I see
the Red Sox lose tomorrow I might still feel upset on my
birthday”). That is, she will probably backcast. On the other
hand, when contemplating or choosing a course of imme-
diate action, such as when choosing between current options
(“I wonder if should go to the Red Sox game tonight or
watch that new comedy instead”), a consumer would prob-
ably begin by simulating the consumption event (“It would
be awful if the Red Sox lost”) and then consider how those
feelings will be changed by the passage of time (“But I
should feel better by my birthday”). That is, she will prob-
ably forecast.
Similarly, people may use backcasting and forecasting
when regulating their feelings in future and current periods,
respectively. Consumers frequently use consumption events
to regulate their mood—for example, buying gifts for them-
selves or listening to music to improve their mood (Chen,
Zhou, and Bryant 2007; Gould 1997). Research shows that
mood regulation can be anticipatory, used to cause a par-
ticular mood for a particular situation, or reactive, used to
alter an existing mood (Erber, Wegner, and Therriault 1996;
Gross 1998). A consumer who wants to achieve a particular
mood in a future situation will probably ﬁrst think about
the future situation and the mood he would like to achieve
and then consider the impact of the consumption event on
his feelings (also suggested in MacInnis et al. [2006]). That
is, she willprobably backcast.Ontheotherhand,aconsumer
who wants to change an existing mood will probably ﬁrst
consider the impact of the consumption event on herfeelings
before considering how those feelings might change over
time. That is, she will probably forecast.
Will Backcasting or Forecasting Lead to More
Accurate Predictions?
We did not measure experienced feelings in these studies
and so cannot know whether our predictors were accurate,
although the impact bias has been obtained for situations
very similar to those used in the current research (e.g., the
use of exams as stimuli in Buehler and McFarland [2001]),
where predictors overestimate the impact of events on their
feelings (Wilson and Gilbert 2003).
Future research is needed to determine whether back-
casting or forecasting leads to more accurate predictions in
general. But even now it is not difﬁcult to speculate about
the circumstances under which each may prove superior. For
example, because backcasting forces consideration of feel-
ings in a future period while forecasting results in neglect
of those feelings, backcasting is likely to be the superior
method when the future period evokes strong feelings. A
car enthusiast who purchases a vintage car may be very
excited about her purchasebut may useforecastingtopredict
she will be less excited in a month. But if that date in a
month is, in fact, the day of her ﬁrst car rally, she may feel
more excited in a month than forecasting led her to expect.
On the other hand, backcasting can foster errors by en-
couraging consumers to heavily weigh impacting events that
may in fact be forgotten by the time the future arrives. A
taxpayer may initially expect to be happy at Christmas until
he considers how unhappy he will be next week on tax day,
at which point he may revise his expectations about Christ-
mas (“I’ll have to give everyone expensive presents when
I can barely afford bus fare!”). But April memoriesarelikely
to fade by December, and this taxpayer will probably feel
much better at Christmas than backcasting led him toexpect.
Thus, it seems likely that each strategy will have its own
domain of applicability and its own domain of susceptibility
to error.
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